This paper considers the prospects for acceptance of an ESV approach to management by US transnational corporations. It begins by explaining management practice, looking first for legal determinants and then at the non-legal causes that actually shape current behavior. US corporate law provides ample space for express recognition of nonshareholder interests and a long-run approach to management. The law does not mandate shareholder primacy. Neither, however, does it require commitment to social responsibility. US law, in other words, is surprisingly agnostic on the important question of management's primary duty. And, by disclaiming a clear definition of the constituencies that management is supposed to serve, the law also declines to address the question of corporate purpose. Despite the emergence in recent years of "soft law" norms that encourage responsibility for human rights and environmental values, international law also does not provide a basis for holding transnational corporations accountable to nonshareholders except in the most egregious cases. Within this legal vacuum, the current practice in the US -shaped by extra-legal factors such as shareholder expectations and management compensation -is to prioritize short-term, quarter-to-quarter share price.
Stakeholder or sustainability considerations typically are ignored unless they bear on that objective.
The ESV approach to management responsibility and corporate purpose was endorsed in the UK Companies Act 2006. Under that statute, management's ultimate responsibility is to the shareholders, but it is required to pursue that objective with regard to long-term consequences, employee interests, relations with suppliers, customers, and others, impact on the community and environment, and the company's ethical reputation. This is, in other words, an explicit repudiation of an exclusive focus on shareholder wealth various ways, members of the public acting as critics and responding to corporate misbehavior can exert pressure on corporations to behave in more socially responsible ways. Conceived of in terms of risk management, attention to stakeholder interests under pressure from public scrutiny may result in better outcomes for affected constituencies.
The market-driven version of ESV discussed here may have limited effects in the longitudinal or temporal dimension. A shift to a long-run approach requires more than just avoidance of human rights or environmental wrongdoing. US corporations also need to discard their preoccupation with short-term, quarter-to-quarter financial results in favor of long-term, sustainable growth and profits. Avoiding litigation or reputational costs does not necessarily imply a reorientation of focus toward the long-run. That is likely to require investments -for example, in improved working conditions or environmental facilitiesthat are costly in the near term and offer only long-run payoffs. Shareholder pressures for short-term results and compensation packages that reward management for delivering them will presumably continue to encourage a myopic outlook. Competition in product markets -especially from firms that already enjoy cost advantages -may also cause reluctance. In short, even if market-based considerations based on risk management can expand management's outlook latitudinally, it is hard to see how they might have that effect in the longitudinal dimension. Law might be necessary to bring about a longitudinal reorientation. latitudinal effects. Risk management concerns driven by externally generated transparency and accountability pressures are leading transnational corporations to pay closer attention to potential human rights and environmental problems. By broadening the range of interests attended to by management to include important stakeholder considerations, ESV therefore does have the potential to produce CSR benefits. This is the sense in which ESV might realistically be characterized as a third way, an alternative to short-term shareholder primacy as well as to an approach to management based on stakeholder balancing. Accordingly, this paper focuses on that aspect of ESV.
This approach to change appears to hold significant promise. Rather than relying on new legal mandates to redefine management responsibility and corporate purpose, extra-legal pressures can have that effect instead. And, because concerned private actors apply the pressure, public opinion about socially acceptable behavior drives management's rethinking of its role. The result may be a richer, more socially-oriented notion of the corporate objective, shaped by public opinion, and this would occur without public intervention through law.
Despite the promise of a public redefinition of corporate purpose without law, some caveats are in order. As mentioned above, it seems unlikely that market-driven ESV will itself be sufficient to produce a commitment to long-run sustainability. There are also some serious questions as to ESV's capacity to broaden management's focus to include important nonshareholder considerations even in the short term. For public pressure to be effective, transparency is necessary so that corporate activity can be subjected to scrutiny.
As explained below, there is no reason to think that private actors alone can generate the amount of information needed to hold transnational corporations fully accountable for their behavior. And, even when misdeeds are exposed and pressure brought to bear, it is not clear that corporations necessarily deal fully with the problems they have created. Public relations and reputational recovery may be the real objective. Finally, and most importantly, this approach to CSR is driven by bottom-line considerations. ESV is still about shareholder value after all, and this objective imposes a limit on how far corporations are likely to be willing to go. Certainly this approach to management will not necessarily result in corporations "doing the right thing" where that would be costly to shareholders. To the extent this is true, critics of transnational corporations should not expect that a commitment to shareholder value -even if enlightened -will necessarily generate the measure of socially responsible behavior that they believe to be appropriate.
There may still be a role for law.
I. Corporate Purpose in the US: Law and Practice

A. Delaware
Under the US federal system, most business corporations are formed pursuant to a state's corporation statute. Because a business need not be headquartered or even do business in the state in which it is incorporated, corporations are free to choose the legal regime that their managers prefer. For most of the largest corporations, the jurisdiction of choice is Delaware. This state's corporation statute and common law therefore govern questions of internal affairs -including the structures and procedures of governance authority -and corporate purpose. US securities law, though complex and intricate, is primarily concerned with disclosure requirements and other mechanisms designed to facilitate shareholders' exercise of substantive rights -such as voting and trading rights -defined by state law regimes. Federal law does not play an important role in the definition of corporate purpose.
It is often assumed that Delaware corporate law mandates a shareholder primacy conception of management's responsibility. 2 This means that the company is supposed to be managed with the financial interests of shareholders primarily in mind. The shareholders' assumed interest in wealth maximization is not to be sacrificed for nonshareholder considerations, such as human rights or environmental concerns. This notion of management's duty in turn implies a particular conception of corporate purpose, which is to generate profits for shareholders.
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The assumption that Delaware law requires shareholder primacy is wrong. It has long been clear that management owes its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty not simply to the shareholders but to the corporation as well. 4 This formulation recognizes the shareholders' special status as residual claimants -they are traditionally referred to as the firm's owners -but at the same time also emphasizes that management is not simply the agent of the shareholders charged with maximizing their wealth. Instead, management is also responsible for the well-being of the corporation as an entity. As such, management must attend to the full range of considerations that determine its well-being. So, for example, in responding to the threat of a hostile takeover, management is supposed to evaluate "its effect on the corporate enterprise." 5 In addition to possible harms to 2 I use the term "management" to refer to the corporation's board of directors and senior officers. 3 Notice that shareholder primacy here refers to the relative weight to be accorded to shareholder versus nonshareholder interests but does not imply primacy as to governance authority. As between managers, shareholders, or other corporate constituencies, management has responsibility for governance, with shareholders exercising only very limited powers of control. The recent "shareholder empowerment" movement in the US aims to redress that balance. shareholders, relevant considerations may include "the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally) . . . ." 6 Only in special cases -when management has chosen to cede its managerial discretion to chart the corporation's future by agreeing to a transfer of control or to the corporation's break-up and dissolution -does its duty change from a responsibility for the well-being of the entity as whole, to one of obtaining the best deal possible for the shareholders alone. Shareholders lack the ability to mount legal challenges to management's exercise of its authority. Under the well-known "business judgment rule," the judiciary will not second-guess strategic and operational decisions as long as they are based on sufficient information, not subject to conflict of interest, and made in good faith. Of special importance is the courts' willingness to defer to managerial judgment about the corporation's long-run best interests. A broad range of decisions that seemingly sacrifice short-term shareholder profits for the sake of nonshareholder considerations can be justified by reference to the corporation's long-run well-being. So, for example, employment policies that seem costly in the short term can be said to improve worker morale and productivity over a longer time horizon. Charitable expenditures or decisions to forego profitable but unsavory business opportunities may enhance the corporation's "good will" among consumers despite immediate impact on profits. When management appeals to long-run corporate benefit, courts do not require a demonstration of actual gains. These "soft law" developments do not as yet provide a legal means for holding transnational corporations accountable for human rights or environmental violations.
Nevertheless, they do constitute an emerging body of substantive norms specifying standards for appropriate corporate behavior. They therefore have the potential to shape corporate management's own sense of responsibility. For example, some of these norms may be incorporated in companies' voluntarily adopted codes of conduct. These norms also provide criteria against which corporate activities can be assessed and evaluated by external critics. As yet, however, as explained below, US corporations tend to define their purpose in terms of shareholder wealth maximization. As a result, it seems clear that emerging "soft law" norms have so far had limited impact.
C. Corporate Purpose in the US Today
While observers of worldwide business practice conclude that CSR is now have allowed short-term considerations to overwhelm the desirable long-term growth and sustainable profit objectives of the corporation."
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The general acceptance of the view that short-term share price maximization is the appropriate objective for managers and shareholders is reflected in current law reform initiatives in the US that would strengthen shareholders' ability to hold management responsible for inadequate financial performance. These initiatives take for granted that accountability to shareholders is the primary objective of corporate law. Strangely, some reformers claim that the excessive risk-taking and abuse of leverage that were major causes of the current financial crisis were due at least in part to insufficient managerial accountability to shareholders. In fact, however, this reckless behavior was a response to investor demands for immediate profits and high stock prices. 31 In this respect, much of the irresponsible activity that led to the financial crisis reflected dominant views about the legitimacy of a short-term focus on shareholder value.
As discussed above, this shareholder primacy approach to corporate purpose and management responsibility is not the result of legal requirements. Instead, several nonlegal factors seem to be at work. Equity-based executive compensation arrangements align management's financial incentives with those of shareholders. 32 To the extent they reward short-term results rather than longer-term performance, these practices encourage management to disregard considerations -including stakeholder considerations -that would benefit the corporation only over the long haul. 
A. Enlightened Shareholder Value
Scholars have suggested that there may be an emerging "third way" between US shareholder primacy and the CSR approach to management -emphasizing stakeholder balancing -that is increasingly influential in much of the rest of the world. 36 The "ESV" model was developed in the UK and is expressed in sec. 172 of the Companies Act 2006.
That provision provides that directors are supposed to promote the interests of the corporation for the benefit of the shareholders but then goes on also to require regard for long-term consequences, employee interests, relations with suppliers, customers, and others, impact on the community and environment, and the company's reputation for "high standards of business conduct." 37 Rather than embracing stakeholderism over shareholder primacy, the approach taken by sec. 172 rejects an emphasis on short-term share price in favor of an approach to management that seeks to promote the long-term sustainability of the firm. A long-term perspective requires attention to the full range of stakeholder concerns that have the capacity to affect the corporation's business success. Sustainability values are thus seen to rest on recognition of the legitimacy of nonshareholder as well as shareholder interests. In this respect, a long-term orientation depends on recognition of the corporation's responsibility to its various internal and external constituencies.
ESV's more expansive time frame and richer sense of the factors that contribute to a business' long-run success resonate with elements of existing US law, particularly the nonshareholder constituency statutes discussed above. As noted, these statutes authorize management to take an enlightened approach to shareholder value that is based on the long-run well-being of the corporation as a whole. The question, then, is whether in the absence of legal mandate US corporations might be persuaded to reorient their priorities. Internal pressures -compensation practices, social norms, and pressure from institutional shareholders -currently drive the shareholder primacy focus, which is understood to require an obsession with short-term share value.
Countervailing external pressures therefore appear to be needed. In the discussion that follows, I explore one possible source of such pressures, management concerns about risk.
Corporations are increasingly augmenting existing approaches to risk monitoring and loss prevention with more sophisticated strategies that recognize the potential costs to the corporation of activities that cause human rights abuses or environmental damage. Such costs can take the form of litigation risk and also the risk of harm to a corporation's reputation. Management has a natural incentive to minimize these risks because they can result in significant expense. Economic self-interest therefore seems to have the potential to generate heightened attention to human rights and environmental considerations.
The dynamic that might produce such outcomes is fairly straightforward. Exposure of human rights or environmental wrongdoing can lead to losses in the form of litigation and settlement costs and also of harm to the corporation's reputation, which in concrete terms can mean lost sales, disinvestment by shareholders, and employee morale problems. 
Reputational Risk
The costs of major human rights or environmental litigation are greater than just the massive expenditures required for defense and resolution. They also present major public relations challenges. This is evident in the fact that settlements often involve more than -25 -typically undertake to assume additional obligations that have nothing directly to do with compensation. These can include contributions designed to improve the quality of life for local residents. Companies will also, if they haven't already, adopt new codes of conduct designed to prevent recurrence of the kind of activities at issue. Nike, discussed below, is an example of this phenomenon. The point is that these initiatives amount to recognition that corporations that have been implicated in these kinds of wrongdoing must take affirmative steps to demonstrate that they disapprove of such conduct and will not engage in it in the future. The motivation is to remove the reputational stain that high-profile litigation leaves on the company's reputation. While avoidance of reputational costs can certainly create incentives to avoid bad behavior, here as with litigation risk it should be kept in mind that this dynamic is subject to built-in limitations. Relatively minor activities are unlikely to trigger significant reputational backlash because they may not receive significant public attention. Further, the desire to avoid bad publicity would not necessarily lead corporations to adopt affirmative measures necessary to shift from a short-term, share price focus to a longerterm, sustainability management philosophy.
C. Accountability
Shareholders
Litigation and reputational risk are matters of financial concern to corporate management because increasingly shareholders are factoring these costs into their decisions about whether to invest in particular companies. This is true not just of "socially responsible" investment funds, for which human rights and environmental issues have always been highly relevant. Mainstream institutional shareholders, concerned primarily about investment return, are also taking an increasingly broad view of risk and are now routinely including so-called "environmental, social, and governance" (ESG) metrics into their investment decisions. information about pending environmental litigation. 49 In this respect, the US differs from a number of European countries. Several require broader environmental disclosure and
France goes further and requires companies whose shares are traded on the Bourse "to provide extremely detailed environmental, labor, community involvement, health, and safety information in its annual reports to shareholders." 50 The EU now requires reporting on social and environmental as well as financial matters.
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Even so, US securities laws do require disclosure of "material" information, including "any known trends or uncertainties" that the reporting corporation expects will have an unfavorable impact on financial performance. 52 This provision is general enough to impose a duty to disclose information about any social or environmental risk that has potentially significant financial implications. As yet the SEC has not interpreted the materiality requirement in terms of a general obligation to report on sustainability or social responsibility issues. However, because the operative criterion is whether a reasonable shareholder would consider the information in question to be important, evolving expectations within the investment community about the relevance of social and environment risk factors are likely to result in more expansive disclosure requirements.
By relying on a general "materiality" requirement defined in terms of investor expectations, US law essentially adopts a market-driven approach to disclosure. This is in contrast to a command-driven approach that would be based on governmental mandate of specific ESG disclosures. It also contrasts with an ethics-based approach that would rely simply on the good will of the corporations themselves, on their desire "to do the right thing." 53 Assigning responsibility to the investment community to shape corporate disclosure according to its own needs has the advantage of placing power in the hands of actors to whom corporations must pay attention. Perhaps this is preferable to government mandates, which generate concerns in the business community about over-regulation and would not necessarily respond accurately to investor needs. Nevertheless, this approach has built-in limits because it is driven solely by investors' concerns about the need for information relevant to pricing decisions. Disclosure that might have other social value but that cannot be linked to investment return therefore is not likely to emerge from this process.
In the US, the SEC defines its mission solely in terms of investor interests. It has not attempted to mandate ESG disclosure but, speaking on behalf of shareholders, it nevertheless is able to influence disclosure practices. An important recent development in this regard is a SEC interpretive release on climate change disclosure. 54 The release offers guidance with reference to four potential issues that could trigger reporting obligations, including the potential impact of pending US legislative and regulatory initiatives and international treaties and accords and also indirect risks such as decreased demand for existing products that produce greenhouse gas emissions. The release also refers expressly expose it to potential adverse consequences to its business operations or financial condition resulting from reputational damage." 55 Although the SEC disclaims any intention to impose any new disclosure obligations, it is nevertheless likely that corporations for whom these issues are potentially relevant will focus more closely on these issues than they have in the past. This will be a significant improvement over recent practice, which according to a one report has produced very little disclosure of climate risk, even in sectors for which carbon reduction is likely to be quite costly.
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In a related development, the SEC late last year reversed a Bush administration policy that had allowed corporations to refuse to include shareholder proposals in their proxy solicitation materials where the proposals were requests for information regarding financial risks associated with environmental, human rights, and other social issues.
57
Now, where the underlying subject matter of the proposal raises a "significant policy issue," shareholders will be able to submit their proposed requests for information to a shareholder vote. Here too the SEC appears to be sympathetic to shareholders' interest in obtaining disclosure of risk information that goes beyond traditional financial metrics.
Although as yet mandated disclosure of human rights and environmental matters is still limited, a number of US companies voluntarily exceed the minimum requirements. As "corporate citizenship" or "corporate responsibility" reports. 60 These focus on the company's good relations with customers, employees, and the broader community. Even if they do not produce a separate document, most Fortune 500 companies now include discussion of stakeholder issues in their annual reports, often quite prominently.
It is important to distinguish between disclosure that candidly and thoughtfully explains potential human rights or environmental problems that might arise out of the company's operations, on the one hand, and less concrete pronouncements about the company's asserted commitment to social and environmental values. The latter is more likely to reflect public relations considerations than it is rigorous self-examination.
Nevertheless, all of this voluntary disclosure does indicate increasing acknowledgement by corporate management that more is expected of business activity than simply the enhancement of share prices.
US developments in the area of voluntary reporting are part of a larger worldwide movement in the direction of expanded corporate disclosure. The Global Reporting
Initiative has developed the GRI Sustainability Reporting Framework. 61 The purpose is to provide a standardized template for economic, environmental, and social disclosure, facilitating thorough treatment of the full range of stakeholder interests and allowing comparisons among companies. Over 1000 organizations are now using GRI guidelines for their social reporting, including 13 percent of the S&P 500 in the US.
External Scrutiny
These developments are important and indicate movement in the direction of routine inclusion of social and environmental considerations in corporate reporting.
Nevertheless, most US transnational companies do not do this or do so only incompletely.
And in many cases disclosure seems to be motivated as much by public relations Through investigation and publicity, NGOs have the potential to expose corporate behavior and policies to a much broader audience than might otherwise learn of them.
Certainly for egregious human rights or environmental abuses, this is likely to provide far greater transparency than would reliance on voluntary disclosure alone. Publicity can also be effective for less dramatic but no less important activities like greenhouse gas emissions that companies also would not necessarily disclose voluntarily.
Greater transparency resulting from NGO activity facilitates public scrutiny and pressure. NGOs are mission-driven, but because they must rely so heavily on private donations, they must necessarily pursue agendas that resonate with public opinion and values. In this way, they act as conduits for the views of a larger public constituency.
Likewise, once the light of publicity has been directed at particular behavior, those members of the public who care can use their resources to bring pressure to bear. As we have seen, this pressure can come from consumers or investors. It may result in litigation but it need not in order to be effective. Ultimately publicity can also result in governmental action, as occurred in India when several states enacted partial bans on sales of Coca-Cola products in the wake of the pesticide controversy mentioned above.
Technology may also make it possible for activists with very limited resources to make a difference. The example of a Californian named Amit Srivastava is instructive.
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Working alone, he has created a website for collection of information about Coca-Cola's public health and environmental offenses in India and serves a resources for activists around the world. His site also provides a coordination point for otherwise dispersed and disconnected local protesters in India. His speeches to college students in the US and
Europe have resulted in a number of colleges banning Coke products. He has organized a "fax action" campaign that resulted in over 9,000 faxes being sent to Coca-Cola headquarters. Even a determined individual apparently can have an impact on public opinion.
Powerful as this process of transparency and pressure can be, it should still be recalled that NGOs and individual activists inevitably have limited resources and areas of interest. There is no reason to think that all of the kinds of problematic corporate behavior that society might legitimately be worried about will be brought to light in this way.
Technology allows anyone with a camera phone and a computer link to YouTube to expose bad behavior, and there is evidently a sympathetic audience for these messages consisting of numerous concerned people around the world who are deeply skeptical about the good will of transnational corporations. Even so, it would be a mistake to conclude that the threat of exposure by private actors can be sufficient to deter the full range of human rights and environmental abuses that businesses are likely to cause. Developing countries, often competing with each other for foreign investment, are concerned about regulations that might deter entry. Multilateral initiatives, if widely adopted, could address concerns about jurisdictional competition by leveling the playing field but as yet consensus on such matters has proved to be exceedingly difficult to realize.
The dynamic sketched here, in contrast, presents the prospect of progress without law, by relying on the financial self-interest of transnational corporations.
Instead of legal mandate, extra-legal pressures reshape management attitudes and behavior. Importantly, these pressures come from private actors, whose influence over corporate behavior causes it to change, in the process in effect redefining corporate purpose. NGOs, community activists, and the media in particular devote substantial resources to the investigation and public exposure of human rights and environmental problems. Consumers can punish companies whose activities they disapprove of by refusing to buy and discouraging others from doing so. Employees' morale may depend in part on a sense that the companies they work for behave in acceptable ways, and this may also be a factor in employee recruitment as well. Institutional shareholders, motivated by concerns about investment return rather than CSR as such, nevertheless must evaluate risk, and pension funds in particular need also to worry about the long-term performance of their portfolios. Corporations seeking investors therefore must increasingly acknowledge that their human rights and environmental policies are relevant to valuation metrics. As part of this process, evolving understandings of materiality in turn encourage disclosure of social and environmental information. In all these ways, segments of the public impose their own notions of appropriate corporate behavior on management. The public rather than the law thus has the potential to redefine corporate purpose.
To be sure, law is not entirely irrelevant to this story. NGOs, activists, consumers, and the media often express their critique of corporate behavior with explicit or implicit reference to western legal rules and principles. Tort law, environmental regulations, or international human rights norms can result in lawsuits. Investors concerned about litigation and reputational risk likewise evaluate corporate policies against a backdrop of law that can result in expensive litigation or provide the basis for negative publicity.
Nevertheless, the point is that pressure to change corporate behavior under the model discussed here comes from a range of private, non-state actors rather than from government acting under color of law and according to a redefined concept of management responsibility and corporate purpose. Sometimes there is an actual or implied threat of resort to legal process but not necessarily. Sometimes the threatened harm may simply be lost business.
Promising as it might be, the process described here, by which the public influences and reshapes corporate purpose, still raises some important questions. First, the process of change based on external pressure depends on exposure of problematic behavior by private actors. Unless human rights or environmental violations are revealed somehow, public opinion cannot bring its power to bear. NGOs, other activists, and the media have limited resources. These actors also have a built-in interest in investigating and documenting especially egregious violations. These are the kinds of wrongdoing that will draw the most attention to the crusaders who expose them; favorable, high profile publicity will garner donations or sell copy. This means that less newsworthy kinds of wrongdoing are less likely to attract attention. Some -perhaps a great deal -of problematic corporate activity inevitably will escape discovery.
Increased corporate disclosure in response to pressure from institutional shareholders likewise is an incomplete source of information on potentially important human rights and environmental matters. Because their concern is investment return, shareholders are typically only interested in such matters to the extent it might affect the corporation's financial performance. Information that is not material in that sense is irrelevant and need not be disclosed, even though it might be important for other, nonfinancial reasons. Moreover, a commitment to sustainability may express itself in many small, seemingly routine policies and decisions. Failures to take adopt measures are likely not material in themselves, even though together they might signal lack of commitment to sustainability values. Again, this class of private actors may lack the incentives to cause corporations to disclose the full range of information that might be of interest to CSR advocates.
If the first set of concerns centers on whether the optimal amount of information will come to light, a second set considers the efficacy of public pressure when information actually is made available. In the most grave cases of abuse, those most likely to be exposed and arouse public outrage, corporations are likely to respond appropriately, by paying compensation, attempting to fix the problem, and, often, investing in improvements for the affected community. They may also embrace general policies that go beyond the particular incident in question and seek to prevent recurrences in other places. In some cases, however, responses may be more symbolic than genuinely transformative. A corporation might announce a high-profile initiative that sounds promising but in fact has a limited impact on the firm's business. This is to be expected. If public opinion is the source of external pressure for change, a response designed to placate the public and deal effectively with the company's reputational concerns may be all that's forthcoming. NGOs or activists may try to expose this fact, but even despite widespread misgivings about corporate good will, a wealthy corporation with a well respected brand may have an advantage in the public relations contest.
A third caveat is particularly important. At the end of the day, even if there is sufficient transparency and public pressure generates genuine accountability, it must be kept in mind that any social benefits depend ultimately and entirely on the corporation's own voluntary choices. The bottom line in most cases will be the bottom line -namely, the impact of the available alternatives on the corporation's finances. All businesses must earn profits in order to survive and prosper. This is just as true for corporations that pay attention to nonshareholder interests as it is for those that pursue short-term shareholder primacy. Confronted with human rights or environmental problems, corporations must engage in cost-benefit analysis just as they do with other business decisions. This perspective imposes a limit to how far a company will be willing to go. Even if its perspective is broader than short-term shareholder value alone, there will be cases where management will not go as far as a robust conception of social responsibility might seem to demand.
This is the key difference between social responsibility mandated by law and socially responsible behavior that is the voluntary response to external pressures based on financial considerations. Even if "enlightened" by a broader sense of corporate purpose, voluntary corporate behavior may not attain the breadth of social responsibility that legal mandate could achieve. This is because law has the power to demand behavior based on a range of criteria. Corporate financial considerations may be one but so too might be human rights or environmental values that are deemed to be right even if they are not profitable. The law thus has the ability to require behavior that would not otherwise be chosen willingly. Those who are committed to human rights and environmental values that cannot be justified in cost-benefit terms may therefore find themselves disappointed by an approach to CSR that is based on shareholder value, however enlightened it might be by the pressures of public opinion.
Conclusion
The promise of the model of ESV analyzed in this paper is the possibility of social responsibility embraced voluntarily by US transnational corporations. This would make up for the absence of legal mandate in this area. Instead, corporations concerned about litigation and reputational risk find it to be in their self-interest to pay attention to human rights and environmental norms of good behavior. Corporate purpose, currently thought of in the US in terms of short-term shareholder value, can be thus be redefined more broadly to encompass nonshareholder interests as well -and the engines of change can be NGOs, community activists, consumers, the media, and even investors, rather than government regulators. We should hesitate, though, before concluding that all is well or soon will be.
For one thing, there is little reason to think that market-based pressures will cause corporate management to discard short-termism in favor of a long-run perspective. There are also reasons to doubt the efficacy of this process as a vehicle for expanding the breadth of management's perspective. Before the public can bring pressure to bear on corporate management, it must have information about what corporations are doing. NGOs, other activists, and the media have had some notable successes exposing cases of egregious corporate behavior, and institutional shareholders are encouraging corporations to expand disclosure beyond traditional financial metrics. Still, though, it would be a mistake to think that these processes will be sufficient to expose the full range of activities that can have negative human rights or environmental impacts. Absent such information accountability necessarily will be limited. Even where the public is made aware of corporate misdeeds and brings pressure to bear, there is reason to doubt that corporate -46 -responses are fully attentive to the affected stakeholder interests. Because management is concerned about reputational costs, it may be motivated by public relations considerations as much as by genuine desire to fix problems and prevent their recurrence. Ultimately, corporate management is and will continue to be driven by cost-benefit concerns, which means that certain problems will not be addressed or prevented if it is not cost-effective to do so. There is, in other words, no reason to think that corporations will voluntarily go as CSR advocates might think they should. From this point of view, then, there is a responsibility gap -a disjunction between actual and ideal behavior -that seems inevitable. How large that gap is and will continue to be is an open question. So too is the question whether we should tolerate it.
